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Open access under CC BYThe objective of this study was to describe the developmental pro-
gression of counterfactual reasoning from childhood to adulthood.
In contrast to the traditional view, it was recently reported by
Rafetseder and colleagues that even a majority of 6-year-old
children do not engage in counterfactual reasoning when asked
counterfactual questions (Child Development, 2010, Vol. 81, pp.
376–389). By continuing to use the same method, the main result
of the current Study 1 was that performance of the 9- to 11-year-
olds was comparable to that of the 6-year-olds, whereas the 12- to
14-year-olds approximated adult performance. Study 2, using an
intuitively simpler task based on Harris and colleagues (Cognition,
1996, Vol. 61, pp. 233–259), resulted in a similar conclusion, spe-
ciﬁcally that the ability to apply counterfactual reasoning is not
fully developed in all children before 12 years of age. We conclude
that children who failed our tasks seem to lack an understanding of
what needs to be changed (events that are causally dependent on
the counterfactual assumption) and what needs to be left
unchanged and so needs to be kept as it actually happened. Alter-
native explanations, particularly executive functioning, are dis-
cussed in detail.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Introduction
Throughout the day, adults drift off into ﬁctional worlds when they watch movies, read books, tell
fairy tales, think about their future, or moan about missed opportunities. The ability to imagine ﬁc-
tional worlds can already be observed in very young children when they create imaginary companions
(Taylor, 1999) or engage in pretend play (e.g., pouring pretend tea into a cup by lifting an empty teapotetseder).
-NC-ND license. 
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very different ways of imagining, they have at least one feature in common: They are to a certain ex-
tent similar to the real world. This is because ﬁctional worlds can never be described to a full extent,
and missing information needs to be imported from real-world knowledge (see Skolnick Weisberg &
Goodstein, 2009, for factors that determine what is imported).
Importing world knowledge into imagined worlds is also crucial for counterfactual reasoning (CFR).
Creating a counterfactual world has been deﬁned as creating an imagined world as close as possible to
the actual world (Lewis, 1973). CFR ‘‘involves a change in some features of the actual world in addition
to those required by the truth of the antecedent of the counterfactual, while other such features are
left unchanged’’ (Woodward, 2011, p. 21). Edgington (2011) clariﬁed that features should be changed
only when they are causally dependent on the antecedent of the counterfactual. The fact that adults
are quite successful in reaching a consensus about counterfactuals suggests that CFR is a highly struc-
tured process (Pearl, 2011).
Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, and Perner (2010) investigated whether adults and children agree on
what needs to be changed and what needs to be left unchanged in order to create a counterfactual
world. They used stories that were acted out with dolls. For instance, in one story world, a mother
sometimes placed candy on the top shelf and sometimes placed it on the bottom shelf of a cupboard.
In Studies 2 and 3, her tall son could only reach the top shelf (he had his leg in a cast and could not
kneel down to reach the bottom shelf), and his little sister could only reach the bottom shelf (she was
not tall enough to reach the top shelf). When the boy came looking for the candy, it ended up in his
room only if it had been placed on the top shelf. If the candy had been placed on the bottom shelf, he
was unable to reach it and it remained there. Similarly, when his sister came looking for the candy, it
ended up in her room only if it had been placed on the bottom shelf. If the candy had been placed on
the top shelf, it remained there.
Adults and children had no problem in predicting what would happen when, for example, the can-
dy was on the top shelf and the girl came; the candy would stay on that shelf and so forth (Rafetseder
et al., 2010). Adults, unlike children, were also able to answer counterfactual questions such as the fol-
lowing (Example 1). The mother placed the candy on the top shelf, and the boy took it to his room.
What if the little girl had come instead of the boy? Where would the candy be? Remarkably, 100%
of the adults, but only 24% of the 6-year-olds, answered correctly that the candy would have stayed
on the top shelf. None of the adults, but most of the children, said that the candy would have ended
up in the girl’s room (which would be the result in a possible world where the candy was on the bot-
tom shelf—in contrast to where it actually was—and the fact that the girl came to get it). There was a
clear consensus among adults, but not among children, of what needs to be changed to be in accor-
dance with the counterfactual assumption and what needs to be left unchanged and so needs to be
imported from the real course of events.
This conclusion gives rise to other questions such as what the underlying cognitive processes are
and when we are fully capable of CFR (in an adult-like sense). Existing data do not provide clear
answers to these two questions. Regarding the second question, a few studies reported that 3- to
4½-year-olds are able to answer counterfactual questions correctly (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apper-
ly, 2006, standard counterfactuals; German & Nichols, 2003; Guajardo, Parker, & Turley-Ames, 2009;
Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Kuczaj & Daly, 1979; Riggs, Peterson,
Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998). Other studies did not ﬁnd this ability before 5 or 6 years of age (Beck
& Crilly, 2009, open counterfactuals; Beck et al., 2006, open counterfactuals; Rafetseder et al.,
2010)—especially when they tested for feelings of regret and relief (Amsel & Smalley, 2000; for further
details, see Amsel et al., 2003; Beck & Crilly, 2009, regret stories; Burns, Riggs, & Beck, 2012; Guttentag
& Ferrell, 2004; O’Connor, McCormack, & Feeney, 2012; Rafetseder & Perner, 2012; Weisberg & Beck,
2010; Weisberg & Beck, 2012). Anticipation of regret, which is important for avoiding negative
outcomes in the future (Epstude & Roese, 2008), does not develop before 9 years of age (Guttentag
& Ferrell, 2008).
To date, it is not clear what accounts for these age discrepancies. Because children’s executive func-
tioning improves throughout preschool (Carlson, 2005), it has been suggested that executive function-
ing explains these discrepancies.
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discrepant ﬁndings of when CFR emerges: Tasks that are successfully completed early in life can be
solved by a simpler reasoning strategy than those that are successfully completed later. That is, the
counterfactual problems that children ﬁnd to be easy can be solved by applying conditionals that ex-
press general regularities to suppositions that can be counter to fact. Rafetseder and colleagues clas-
siﬁed this as a case of basic conditional reasoning (BCR). For instance, in Example 1 above, when the
mother placed the candy on the top shelf and the boy brought it to his room, children below a certain
age treated the counterfactual question ‘‘Where would the candy be if the girl had come instead of the
boy to look for it?’’ by simply disregarding the fact that the mother had placed it on the top shelf and
answered that it would be in the girl’s room.1 In other words, although they could reason with anteced-
ents counter to fact (if the girl had come, the candy would not be where it is now, in the boy’s room, but
rather somewhere else), they failed to take into account the constraint on CFR to stick as closely as pos-
sible to the given facts. The fact that the mother had placed the candy on the top shelf needs to be im-
ported from the real course of events because it is causally independent of the counterfactual antecedent
(the girl comes looking for the candy), a principle that Rafetseder and colleagues referred to as the nearest
possible world constraint (based on Lewis, 1973). All adult participants obeyed this constraint, but fewer
than a quarter of the 6-year-old participants gave the correct answer in Example 1 (Rafetseder et al.,
2010, 24% correct).
Interestingly, when the mother placed the candy on the bottom shelf and the boy came in search of
it (Example 2), children had little difﬁculty in answering the counterfactual question that the candy
would be in the girl’s room if the girl had come instead of the boy (Rafetseder et al., 2010, 88% correct).
The difference in difﬁculty between Example 1 and Example 2 was explained as follows. In Example 1
(candy placed on the top shelf), BCR gives a different answer (in the girl’s room) than CFR (on the top
shelf). On the contrary, in Example 2 (candy placed on the bottom shelf), CFR and BCR give the same
answer (in the girl’s room). Rafetseder and colleagues (2010) concluded that studies in which very
young children are able to give the correct answer to counterfactual questions (e.g., the stories used
by Harris et al., 1996) did not take into consideration children’s use of BCR. To our knowledge, there
is only one study that checked for answers based on BCR, and this study was conducted with children
who were 6 years of age or younger and whose performance was close to ﬂoor in the critical condition
(Rafetseder et al., 2010). So, our ﬁrst aim was to establish when children become able to give the same
answer as adults in this condition.
Study 1
The current study used the paradigm of Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, Studies 2 and 3), who col-
lected data with 5- and 6-year-old children as well as with adults ranging in age from 14;7 to 75;10
(years;months). The main aim of the current study was to look at the developmental trajectory of CFR
beyond 6 years of age with 9- to 14-year-olds when controlling for answers based on BCR.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 34 children and adolescents (11 girls and 23 boys) from a nursery school,
two youth centers, and a scout group. The age range was between 9;0 and 14;5. The mean age was
11;9 with a standard deviation of 2;0. For later analysis, the overall sample was split into two age
groups. The ages of the 18 children ranged from 9;0 to 11;1 (M = 10;0, SD = 0;7), and the ages of
the 16 adolescents ranged from 12;5 to 14;5 (M = 13;9, SD = 0;8). In this and the subsequent study,
children and adolescents were recruited by writing to the parents of the children and adolescents from1 Obermayr (2011) showed that when children are told that the mother has placed the candy into one of the boxes (without
being told which box) and are then asked ‘‘What will happen to the candy when the girl comes looking for it?’’ 71% (n = 17) of the
6- to 9-year-olds answered accordingly with ‘‘it will end up in the girl’s room’’, whereas only one child stated that more
information is needed in order to be able to answer this question. Three further children went for the assumption that the girl is
not tall enough and, therefore, that the candy will stay in the top box.
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consent. Participants spoke German as their ﬁrst language and came from a mixed working- and
middle-class population.
Materials
To control for story-speciﬁc effects, we used two different story worlds sketched with two different
wooden models that were built on 42  30-cm platforms. The model for the candy story consisted of a
cupboard with a shelf centrally placed and two boxes: a brown one placed on the shelf and an orange
one placed beneath that shelf. We used candy and two dolls, a female one and a male one twice as tall
as the female ﬁgure, to act out the story. Each doll had its own room, including a table and a photo of
the female doll in one room and the male doll in the other room.
The model for the second story, the dwarf story, consisted of a hut and a large walnut tree located
behind it (the hut represented the top shelf and the walnut tree represented the bottom shelf of the
candy story). We used walnuts, a dwarf (representing the boy), and a squirrel (representing the girl) to
act out the story. The dwarf lived in the dwarf village (three houses were drawn on a piece of card-
board, representing the boy’s room) and the squirrel lived in a nest in another tree (representing
the girl’s room).
Design
Each child was tested individually in a 20-min session during which we presented both story
worlds (candy story and dwarf story) and asked eight control questions per story world to be sure that
the children remembered all of the details. For the candy story, these questions were as follows. Which
one is Simon’s/Julia’s room? (Questions 1 and 2). From which shelf can Simon/Julia take the candy?
(Questions 3 and 4). Where does Simon/Julia bring the candy to? (Questions 5 and 6). Why is
Simon/Julia not able to take the candy from the bottom/top shelf? (Questions 7 and 8). For the dwarf
story, we asked the same questions again, tailored to the dwarf and the squirrel.
Each child was told about and watched two events (one per story world), for example, that the can-
dy is on the top shelf today. The child was asked an indicative future question for each event (e.g.,
‘‘What will happen to the candy when the boy comes looking for it?’’) and a subjunctive past (coun-
terfactual) question (e.g., ‘‘What if the little girl had come looking for the candy instead of the boy?
Where would the candy be?’’). Each child answered a total of two indicative future questions and
two subjunctive past questions. For one subjunctive past question, BCR and CFR resulted in a different
answer (as was the case for Example 1 described above), and for the other subjunctive past question,
BCR and CFR resulted in the same answer (as described in Example 2 above). The order of the stories
and the conditions were counterbalanced.
Procedure
Each child was tested at his or her respective institution in a quiet area away from the other chil-
dren. The candy story was about Simon and his little sister Julia, both of whom had their own room
(portrayed with a table and a photo of each protagonist). There was also a kitchen (portrayed with
a cupboard and two boxes: one on the bottom shelf of the cupboard and one higher up). When their
mother bought the candy, she placed it either in the box on the top shelf or in the box on the bottom
shelf. Simon was tall enough to reach the top shelf, but he had his leg in a cast and could not kneel
down to reach the bottom box. Julia could reach the bottom shelf, but she was not tall enough to reach
the top shelf. If Julia found candy on the bottom shelf, she brought it into her room, and if Simon found
candy on the top shelf, he brought it into his room.
The dwarf story was about a dwarf who lived in a dwarf village and a squirrel that lived in a nest on
a tree. Both the dwarf and the squirrel liked nuts very much. In their search for nuts, they came across
a nut tree under which a hut had been built. The hut had a hole in its roof, and the nuts fell through
this hole into the hut. The dwarf was too clumsy to climb up the nut tree, but he could open the door of
the hut to collect some nuts. The squirrel, in contrast, could not open the door of the hut, but it could
climb up the tree to get to the nuts. Note that all of the nuts were either in the hut or on the nut tree. If
the dwarf found nuts in the hut, he brought them back to the dwarf village, and if the squirrel found
nuts on the nut tree, it brought them to its nest.
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events. Each event was a combination of where the object of desire was located (top shelf–bottom
shelf, hut–nut tree) and which character came to collect it (boy–girl, dwarf–squirrel). For each event,
an indicative future question and a subjunctive past question were asked. The following is an exam-
ple: ‘‘Today the bottom shelf is empty. There is only candy on the top shelf.’’ At this point, the child
was asked the following questions:
Memory 1: ‘‘Where is the candy now?’’
Indicative future: ‘‘What will happen to the candy when the boy comes looking for it?’’ (German ori-
ginal version: ‘‘Was passiert mit dem Zuckerl wenn jetzt der Simon kommt und nach Zuckerl
sucht?’’)
After the child had given an answer, the indicative future event was played out: ‘‘Look! This time
the boy comes looking for the candy. He ﬁnds it on the top shelf and takes it to his room!’’
Memory 2: ‘‘Where is the candy now?’’
Subjunctive past: ‘‘What if the little girl had come looking for the candy instead of the boy? Where
would the candy be?’’ (German original version: ‘‘Aber, wenn nicht der Simon sondern die kleine
Julia nach Zuckerl gesucht hätte, wo wäre denn dann das Zuckerl?’’)
Results
Control, memory, and indicative future questions
Children answered all control and memory questions correctly. Performance on the indicative fu-
ture questions was also at ceiling. Children understood that under some conditions the protagonist
could not reach the item.
Subjunctive past questions
Fig. 1 shows the children’s performance on the subjunctive past questions of the current study
(black circles) and of Studies 2 and 3 reported by Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, gray triangles).
The results are divided to show the conditions (a) in which BCR resulted in a different answer than
CFR (dashed lines) and (b) in which BCR resulted in the same answer as CFR (solid lines).Fig. 1. Percentages of correct answers in the current Study 1 (black circles) and from Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, Studies 2
and 3) (gray triangles). Adapted with permission from ‘‘Counterfactual reasoning: Developing a sense of ‘nearest possible
world’’’ by E. Rafetseder, R. Cristi-Vargas, and J. Perner, 2010, Child Development, Vol. 81, p. 384.
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represented by the dashed lines in Fig. 1), the performance of the 9- to 11-year-olds was signiﬁcantly
different from the performance of the 12- to 14-year-olds; whereas the 9- to 11-year-olds answered
only 39% of the subjunctive past questions correctly (M = 0.39, 99% conﬁdence interval [CI] [0.05,
0.73]), the 12- to 14-year-olds answered all subjunctive past questions correctly, U = 56.0, z = –3.75,
p < .001; effect size estimate: r = .64. The 9- to 11-year-olds’ performance did not differ signiﬁcantly
from chance level, v2(2, N = 18) = 2.33, p = .31. The chance level was taken to be .33, assuming that
the four different locations (top, bottom, girl’s room, and boy’s room) were possible answers and sub-
tracting the location where the item really was because children at this age did not commit the realist
error anymore. They systematically gave the wrong answer (73% of all errors) and said that the search-
er would have taken the item (even though he or she would not have been able to do so). The two age
groups did not differ in terms of correct answers for the other conditions where BCR and CFR resulted
in the same answer (solid line), U = 128.0, z = –1.35, p = .18; effect size estimate: r = .23.
The performance of the 9- to 11-year-olds (current study) was similar to that of the 6-year-olds in
Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, Study 2). In contrast, the performance of the 12- to 14-year-olds
(current study) was very different from that of the 6-year-olds in the most critical conditions (dashed
line in Fig. 1 and 24% correct) but not in the other conditions (solid line, 88% correct). In fact, the per-
formance of the 12- to 14-year-olds (current study) was similar to that of the adult control group in
Rafetseder and colleagues (2010, Study 3) for all conditions.Discussion
CFR means creating the nearest possible world (Lewis, 1973). In other words, when reasoning
counterfactually, one needs to create an imagined world that is causally compatible with the counter-
factual assumption (Edgington, 2011). Unknown factors in this imagined scenario, however, must be
ﬁlled with facts from the real-world scenario. In contrast to other types of reasoning, CFR must coor-
dinate the counterfactual scenario with the real-world event. It was concluded recently (Rafetseder
et al., 2010) that adults, but not children, follow this constraint. Apparently, younger children do
not take into account special instances of the real-world event except by default, chance, or natural
bias, and they make assumptions using BCR. Study 1 investigated how CFR developmentally pro-
gresses from childhood to adulthood.
To our surprise, it was not until 12 years of age that all children responded in an adult-like manner,
that is, answered correctly in those conditions where BCR led to the wrong answer (only CFR resulting
in the correct answer). One concern, however, is that the story world of Study 1 is unnecessarily com-
plicated. It would be reassuring if the same difﬁculties with CFR could be replicated in a simpler story
world. The aim of Study 2 was to create a setting where children do not need to learn and memorize
arbitrary rules.Study 2
For Study 2, we used story worlds that could be understood without children needing to learn a set
of rules at the start. For instance, children were shown a clean ﬂoor. Then they saw that Carol came
home and did not take her dirty shoes off, and she made the ﬂoor all dirty with her shoes. It has been
reported (Harris et al., 1996) that even 3-year-olds answered 75% of the past subjunctive questions
correctly (e.g., ‘‘If Carol had taken her shoes off, would the ﬂoor be dirty or clean?’’). One problem with
this procedure is that with the children’s answer ‘‘clean,’’ it is impossible to determine whether they
used BCR (‘‘When somebody takes dirty shoes off, ﬂoors tend to stay clean’’) or CFR (‘‘If Carol had taken
her shoes off, then she would not have made the clean ﬂoor dirty and the ﬂoor would have stayed
clean’’).
In Study 2, therefore, we introduced a second puppet, Max, who made the clean ﬂoor dirty with his
shoes right after Carol did so. When asked ‘‘What if Carol had taken her shoes off? Would the ﬂoor be
dirty or clean?’’ CFR led to a ‘‘dirty’’ answer (if Carol had taken her shoes off, then she would not have
made the ﬂoor dirty, but the ﬂoor would have been made dirty by Max anyway). In contrast, BCR led to
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Carol takes her shoes off, the ﬂoor will stay clean.
To prevent confusion, we refer to the counterfactual task that can be solved even with BCR as the
undiscriminating task (BCR = CFR) and refer to the counterfactual task that can be solved only with
CFR as the discriminating task (BCR– CFR). We are not claiming that participants who apply CFR
on both tasks would ﬁnd it easier to do so on the undiscriminating task than on the discriminating
task. The main difference is that we can distinguish BCR from CFR in the discriminating task, whereas
this is not possible in the undiscriminating task. Based on Study 1, we expect that children up to
11 years of age ﬁnd the task in which BCR leads them to the correct answer to be easy, but ﬁnd the
task in which BCR leads them to the wrong answer to be difﬁcult. As children increase in age, this dif-
ference should vanish.
Method
Participants
There were 20 kindergarten children (14 girls and 6 boys) aged 5;0 to 6;1 (M = 5;8, SD = 0;4), 20
younger school children (7 girls and 13 boys) aged 7;9 to 10;8 (M = 9;9, SD = 0;11), 21 older school
children (5 girls and 16 boys) aged 13;6 to 15;3 (M = 14;5, SD = 0;5), and 21 adults (14 women and
7 men) aged 22;9 to 67;8 (M = 31;0, SD = 11;10). The kindergarten children were recruited from a
nursery school in a rural area, and the school children were recruited from two schools in a mid-sized
city. All institutions were serving a mixed working- and middle-class population. Participants of the
oldest age group were mostly students or adults with a higher level of education. All participants
spoke German as their ﬁrst language.
Materials
We reused the story that Harris and colleagues used in their 1996 study and developed three fur-
ther stories. For each of the four stories, there was an undiscriminating version and a discriminating
version, and we used the same material in both versions. For the painting and sleeping stories, we used
puppets that were approximately 10 cm tall and made of wood and cloth as well as wooden plates and
some essential props. For the becoming wet story, we used a plastic ﬁgure approximately 8 cm tall, a
plastic plate with a little garden, a pool, and a spray bottle with water to simulate rain. For the dirty
shoes story, we used plastic ﬁgures approximately 4 cm tall, a plastic plate, and a hazel nut spread to
simulate dirt. For each story, we had two pictures showing the possible ﬁnal states of the story. This
was used as a different answer format to enhance the performance of the youngest participants who
might have problems giving a verbally correct answer.
Design
Each participant was given the four different stories either in the order of (1) dirty shoes, (2) sleep-
ing, (3) becoming wet, and (4) painting or in the reversed order (4 to 1). The stories were told either in
the undiscriminating version or in the discriminating version, and each participant was told two
undiscriminating and two discriminating versions. The order in which these versions were given
was fully counterbalanced. To avoid answer biases, the order of the verbs of interest was completely
balanced in the subjunctive past question (‘‘. . . would the ﬂoor be clean or dirty?’’ vs. ‘‘. . . would the
ﬂoor be dirty or clean?’’). In addition, in each version, the participant needed to answer a now control
question (for the dirty shoes task: ‘‘What does the ﬂoor look like now?’’) and a before control question
(‘‘What did the ﬂoor look like before Susi/the children walked over it?’’).
Procedure
The test was conducted in a quiet area at the respective institution and took approximately 15 min.
The procedure was the same in each age group. Every participant was told all four stories, which were
acted out with props. The participant was then asked questions that needed to be answered verbally
and by also pointing to a picture. For example, in the undiscriminating version of the dirty shoes story,
the background was explained as follows: ‘‘One day the ﬂoor is nice and clean, but then something
happens. Susi comes home and doesn’t take her shoes off. She walks in and makes the ﬂoor all dirty.’’
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clean or dirty now?’’ and ‘‘Was the ﬂoor clean or dirty before Susi walked in?’’ After this, the subjunc-
tive past question was asked: ‘‘What would have happened if Susi had taken her shoes off? Would the
ﬂoor be clean or dirty?’’ (German original version: ‘‘Was wäre wenn die Susi die Schuhe ausgezogen
hätte? Wäre der Boden dann sauber oder dreckig?’’). After answering verbally, the participant was
shown two pictures, one of a clean ﬂoor and one of a dirty ﬂoor, and was asked, ‘‘What would it look
like?’’ In the discriminating version, the story was slightly different: ‘‘One day the ﬂoor is nice and
clean, but then something happens. Susi and Max come home and they don’t take their shoes off. They
walk in . . ..’’ From here onward, the story was the same as in the undiscriminating version, and the
same questions were asked and the same pictures of the ﬂoor were shown: one with one pair of dirty
footprints and one with no dirty footprints. It is important to note that Susi walked in ﬁrst and Max
walked in immediately after her. As a consequence, the ﬂoor was clean before Susi walked in, as was
the case in the undiscriminating version. This was to ensure that the answers to the control questions
were the same across conditions and to prevent these from having an impact on the subsequent coun-
terfactual questions.
The logic of the other three stories was the same. In the undiscriminating version of the sleeping
story, a baby was sleeping when her older sister came home, started playing the drums, and woke
the baby up. Then, the child was asked whether the baby would be awake or asleep if the sister
had not played the drums. In the discriminating version, the sister was again playing the drums,
but also their grandma dropped a pot, which would have woken up the baby anyway. In the becoming
wet story, a girl was playing in the yard when it suddenly started raining. If it had not started raining,
the girl would have been dry in the undiscriminating version, but because of also jumping into a pool,
the girl would still have been wet in the discriminating version. In the painting story, Hans was draw-
ing a house on a plain sheet of paper. In the undiscriminating version, the sheet of paper would be
blank if he had not started drawing. In the discriminating version, another child also drew on the pa-
per. So, if Hans had not drawn anything, there would still be another drawing on the sheet of paper.Results
Control questions
Answers to the now and before control questions were quite accurate. Only four 5- and 6-year-olds
and one 14-year-old made mistakes. Each of these children gave only one wrong answer. For this rea-
son, they were not excluded from the sample. In total, 99% of the now control questions and 98% of the
before control questions were answered correctly. It can be assumed that children understood and
remembered the content of the stories very well.Subjunctive past questions
Overall, the four stories were comparable in difﬁculty (correct answers: 68% for dirty shoes, 61% for
sleeping, 68% for becoming wet, and 69% for painting), Friedman’s test, v2(3, N = 82) = 0.36, p = .31.
Therefore, we ran analyses averaged across all four stories. Participants answered signiﬁcantly more
subjunctive past questions correctly in the undiscriminating versions (98%, M = 1.96, 99% CI [1.91,
2.02]) than in the discriminating versions (64%,M = 1.28, 99% CI [1.03, 1.53]), z = –5.40, p < .001; effect
size estimate: r = .30. Fig. 2 shows participants’ performance on the subjunctive past questions accord-
ing to age groups.
The adult group answered all subjunctive past questions in the undiscriminating version correctly
and answered nearly all of them correctly in the discriminating version (95%, M = 1.90, 99% CI [1.72,
2.09]), resulting in a nonsigniﬁcant difference (z = –1.41, p = .16; effect size estimate: r = .15).
The 13- to 15-year-olds’ performance differed signiﬁcantly (z = –2.24, p = .03; effect size estimate:
r = .24) between the undiscriminating condition (100%) and the discriminating condition (88%,
M = 1.76, 99% CI [1.49, 2.03]). A McNemar test (based on a binomial distribution—children answered
either one or two of two questions correctly), however, revealed a marginally signiﬁcant result
(p = .06). Focusing only on the discriminating version, the 13- to 15-year-olds performed similarly well
as adults did, U = 189.0, z = –1.23, p = .22; effect size estimate: r = .19.
Fig. 2. Percentages of correct answers in the current Study 2. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
E. Rafetseder et al. / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 114 (2013) 389–404 397All errors in the group of the 13- to 15-year-olds occurred exclusively in the sleeping story. A baby
was sleeping when her older sister came home and started playing the drums. Subsequently, their
grandma dropped a pot and the baby woke up. Five adolescents stated that if the sister had not played
the drums, the baby would not have woken up. Interestingly, three of them explained that this would
have been the case because their grandma would not have dropped the pot either. We counted these
answers as incorrect for the following reasons. First, the counterfactual antecedent did not ask partic-
ipants to make these assumptions (as also indicated by adults’ answers). Second, these problems did
not occur in the other stories because the two events were clearly causally independent and these sto-
ries did not differ signiﬁcantly from the sleeping story in terms of correct answers.
The 7- to 10-year-olds gave perfect answers in the undiscriminating version but not in the discrim-
inating version (53%, M = 1.05, 99% CI [0.45, 1.65]), z = –3.07, p = .002; effect size estimate: r = .34. The
number of correct answers in the discriminating version differed signiﬁcantly from a random distri-
bution, v2(2, 20) = 9.90, p = .007. Among children in this age group, 40% (n = 8) gave no correct answer,
15% (n = 3) gave one correct answer, and 45% (n = 9) gave two correct answers. A comparison of the
7- to 10-year-olds with the older participants with respect to the discriminating version revealed sig-
niﬁcant differences (compared with the 13- to 15-year olds: U = 124.5, z = –2.56, p = .01; effect size
estimate: r = .40; compared with the adults: U = 106.5, z = –3.29, p = .001; effect size estimate: r = .51.
The 5- and 6-year-olds gave 93% correct answers (M = 1.85, 99% CI [1.62, 2.08]) in the undiscrim-
inating version but gave only 18% (M = 0.35, 99% CI [0.04, 0.66]) in the discriminating version, z =
–3.87, p < .001; effect size estimate: r = .43. Their numbers of correct answers in the discriminating
version differed signiﬁcantly from a guessing distribution (25%: no correct answers; 50%: one correct
answer; 25%: two correct answers), v2(2, 20) = 18.70, p < .001. Among children in this age group, 65%
(n = 13) gave no correct answer, 35% (n = 7) gave one correct answer, and no child answered both
subjunctive past questions of the discriminating version correctly. The 5-year-olds gave signiﬁcantly
fewer correct answers in the discriminating version than all of the other groups (smallest difference
with the 7- to 10-year-olds: U = 118.5, z = –2.42, p = .02; effect size estimate: r = .38).Discussion
Results in the undiscriminating counterfactual condition conﬁrm what was reported in 1996 by
Harris and colleagues with 3-year-olds who answered 75% of counterfactual questions correctly. In
our study, 5- and 6-year-olds answered 93% correctly. However, the ﬁndings by Rafetseder and
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ing correct answers because they were applying CFR or because they were using BCR. In Study 2,
therefore, we used the discriminating version of the task by Harris and colleagues (1996), in which
answers based on CFR could be distinguished from answers based on BCR. The 5-year-olds’ correct an-
swers dropped to 18%, and even the 7- to 10-year-olds answered only 53% of the questions correctly. It
was not until around 13 to 15 years of age that the participants reached adult-like performance.
The results of Study 2 support the ﬁndings of Study 1, in which the 9- to 11-year-olds answered
only 39% of the questions correctly in the condition where answers based on CFR differed from those
based on BCR. Even though there is a tendency for children to ﬁnd the task in Study 2 slightly easier
than the task in Study 1, this tendency is nominal.
Study 2 also supports results that were published by Ferrell, Guttentag, and Gredlein (2009). They
told children stories about two characters who suffered from the same outcome, for example, falling
off a swing that was slightly broken. The difference was that Character A could have chosen another
swing that was intact. So, if Character A had gone for the other swing, she would not have fallen off the
swing. In contrast, if Character B had gone for the other swing, she would have fallen off anyway be-
cause the other swing was broken too. In the explicit version, children were asked whether one of
these two characters felt worse than the other. Only 36% of the 8-year-olds reasoned that Character
A would have felt worse (because this character could have gone for a better option). If, however, chil-
dren reasoned with a simpler reasoning strategy on both tasks (i.e., that choosing a different swing—
based on the counterfactual antecedent—would have resulted in a different outcome), they arrived at
the same answer for both characters (not falling off the swing and so feeling okay, disregarding the
fact that the second swing for Character B was broken). The majority of the 8-year-olds concluded that
both characters felt the same, which is yet another indication that they did not apply CFR.General discussion
The results of the reported studies suggest that children’s ability to reason counterfactually is not
fully developed in all children before 12 years of age (showing great variability in performance, espe-
cially at around 10 years). These results, together with previous work, suggest a continuum along
which children gradually come to engage in adult-like counterfactual reasoning. Rafetseder and col-
leagues (2010) suggested that the counterfactual tasks that even young children complete with no dif-
ﬁculty may be solved with simpler reasoning strategies (e.g., by BCR). When checking for answers
based on simpler reasoning strategies (only CFR resulting in the correct answer), children found these
tasks to be very difﬁcult at 6 years of age and even later on, as indicated by the current results.
Can executive functioning account for these difﬁculties? Inhibition (to resist making prepotent but
inappropriate responses), cognitive ﬂexibility (to ﬂexibly switch perspectives or strategies), and work-
ing memory (to keep information in mind and manipulate it) are the three components of executive
functioning being primarily discussed (Diamond, 2006, p. 70).
Inhibitory control is an undeniably important factor for reasoning with assumptions that are coun-
ter to fact, as is the case with pretend play (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993), creating imaginary compan-
ions (Taylor, 1999), reasoning with false beliefs (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), and future
hypothetical reasoning (Robinson & Beck, 2000). Even children who apply BCR need to have sufﬁcient
inhibitory strength; otherwise, they would commit the reality bias. Furthermore, inhibitory control
predicts logical reasoning abilities in children even when they are older than 4 years (Handley, Capon,
Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004). This can be taken as an indication that successful reasoning not
only asks for overcoming the temptation to answer with what is the real state of affairs but also asks
for inhibiting ‘‘heuristically cued responses’’ (Handley et al., 2004, p. 192) or individual beliefs that are
irreconcilable with the logically valid conclusion.
In the case of CFR, inhibitory control is needed to overcome the temptation of answering with what
is the actual state of affairs instead of answering with what would be or would have been the case. A
clear sign of children being able to do so is their passing the false belief test. Several studies showed
that CFR abilities are related to explicit understanding of false belief (Ecker, 2011; German & Nichols,
2003; Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Hofer, 2010; Müller, Miller,
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itory control is a partially mediating factor (Drayton, Turley-Ames, & Guajardo, 2011). Inhibition has
also been found to predict performance on counterfactual tasks (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009), but not
whether they experience counterfactual emotions such as regret (Burns et al., 2012).
Although the gain of inhibitory control might serve as an explanation for why children stop com-
mitting the reality bias on false belief and counterfactual questions (see also Rafetseder & Perner,
2010), it hardly explains why even older children give wrong answers on our critical conditions.
The interference of reality with what needs to be counterfactually assumed is the same among all con-
ditions; the girl comes instead of the boy, and so the candy would be somewhere else than where it
really is. So, inhibition of the real events interfering in CFR should be the same, and yet there are some
conditions that are much more difﬁcult than others. Children ﬁnd the condition in which the candy
was on the top shelf and they were asked where the candy would be if the little girl had come search-
ing instead of the boy to be much more difﬁcult than the condition in which the candy was on the
bottom shelf (and everything else was the same).
Cognitive ﬂexibility, the second component of executive functions, is important for switching
between the counterfactual and the real world. It has been reported that counterfactual thoughts in-
crease cognitive ﬂexibility. For example, participants who are primed with a counterfactual mind-set
(scenarios that produce counterfactual thoughts) are more likely to solve the Duncker candle task—a
measure of ﬂexibility in problem solving—compared with people who were given noncounterfactual
primes (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). Cognitive ﬂexibility partially mediates the relationship be-
tween performance on counterfactual tasks and that on false belief tasks (Guajardo et al., 2009) and
predicts whether children experience regret or not (Burns et al., 2012).
Burns et al. (2012) found that the better 4- to 7-year-olds performed on a task measuring switching
abilities, the more likely they were to show counterfactual emotions such as regret. This was inter-
preted as showing that one needs to switch back and forth between the counterfactual world and
the real world to experience regret (Burns et al., 2012, p. 503). Moreover, it is generally agreed that
CFR requires two models: one about the actual sequence of events and one about the assumed
(hypothesized) sequence of events (Byrne, 2005). People who are using CFR are constantly looking
for repercussions of what is possible in the imagined model based on what must be true in the actual
model (Perner & Rafetseder, 2011). BCR, in contrast, needs only one model, either about actual events
(we have knowledge about the real event and add some new information by applying the laws that
hold in this world) or about imagined events (we imagine some event and add new information by
applying the laws in this world, e.g., by pretending to wipe up spilled pretend tea with a towel (Harris
& Kavanaugh, 1993)). Children who apply BCR might be the ones who actually do not have enough
cognitive ﬂexibility to switch between the two worlds and so perform poorly on the critical
conditions.
An experiment by Beck et al. (2006) goes against this hypothesis. The 5- and 6-year-old children
put out two mats before a mouse came down on one side of a slide that split into two branches half-
way down (inverse Y-shape). Thus, they acknowledged that different events can possibly happen at a
speciﬁc time. Moreover, all children answered correctly that after the mouse had come down on one
side (e.g., the left one), the mouse would be on the right side if it had gone the other way. They seemed
to grasp that the word ‘‘other’’ needs to be construed as an alternative to a reference point in the actual
world (other than the left side), which shows their ability to refer to the real world and construe a pos-
sible world in relation to the real world. In short, lack of cognitive ﬂexibility is an unlikely explanation
for children’s difﬁculty in applying CFR.
The third component of executive functioning, working memory, has been found to account for the
development of conditional reasoning (Barrouillet & Lecas, 1999), a close relative of CFR. With an
increasing working memory span, children are able to think of more models in accordance with the
conditional interpretation. Santamaría, Espino, and Byrne (2005) supplied evidence that people keep
two models (‘‘p and q’’ as well as ‘‘not p and not q’’) in mind to understand counterfactual statements,
whereas they keep only one model (‘‘p and q’’) in mind to understand indicative statements. It is in
fact reported repeatedly that reasoning with indicative statements develops earlier than reasoning
with counterfactual statements (Beck et al., 2006; Perner et al., 2004; Rafetseder et al., 2010; Riggs
& Peterson, 2000; Riggs et al., 1998; Robinson & Beck, 2000, Study 1).
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developed before 6 years of age (Beck et al., 2006). Only at 6 years do most children put out two mats,
one at each of the two ends of an inverse Y-shaped slide, in order to make sure that the mouse that
comes down the slide does not get hurt no matter which branch it happens to take. Younger children,
in contrast, placed out only one mat at the end of one of the branches.
Some studies reported working memory capacity to be related to the amount of counterfactual
questions answered correctly (Drayton et al., 2011; Guajardo et al., 2009), but other studies did not
conﬁrm this for either counterfactual questions (Beck et al., 2009) or experience of regret (Burns
et al., 2012). These studies used different types of counterfactual tasks, which may explain the incon-
sistency of results. In short, there is no clear-cut relationship between working memory capacity and
CFR.
The working memory failure nevertheless might provide a convincing explanation as to why chil-
dren fail the tasks with discriminating conditions but perform well on the undiscriminating tasks. To
be successful, children need to change all of the features of the real world that are causally dependent
on the counterfactual assumption but leave everything else the same. Rafetseder and colleagues
(2010) referred to this as the nearest possible world constraint. We can think of two explanations
as to why children fail to follow this constraint:
(a) Working memory overload: Children actually understand that they need to follow this constraint,
but their limited working memory capacity prevents them from doing so.
(b) Lack of understanding the constraint: Children do not understand that they need to change every-
thing that is causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption but leave untouched every-
thing that is causally independent of that assumption.
Explanation (a) suggests that children fail the task with the discriminating conditions because they
need to think of additional information, such as that the girl cannot reach the top shelf or that Max left
his shoes on, which is information they do not need to consider with the undiscriminating conditions.
This might put a greater burden on their working memory, causing an overload, which results in fall-
ing back on BCR and consequently a wrong answer to the test question. Drayton and colleagues (2011)
reported that 5-year-old children who performed better on counterfactual tasks had higher working
memory scores. In their study, children received antecedent and consequent counterfactual tasks.
In the consequent version, they were asked counterfactual questions such as ‘‘If there had not been
a ﬁre, where would Peter be?’’ These are tasks that even very young children can solve correctly (Riggs
et al., 1998), most likely because they are using simpler reasoning strategies (Rafetseder & Perner,
2010). In the antecedent tasks, children were asked to imagine that they had made the ﬂoor dirty.
Then, they needed to think of what they could have done to prevent the ﬂoor from being dirtied
(e.g., take shoes off, wipe off shoes). Children’s answers were judged as correct whenever they pro-
vided one plausible statement. Again, it is highly likely that children used simpler reasoning strategies
(rather than CFR) in order to get this task right. Asking children what one could have done in order to
prevent the ﬂoor from getting dirtied would result in the same answer as when asking children what
one could do in order to prevent the ﬂoor from getting dirty. Thus, from children’s answers, we cannot
be sure whether they indeed used CFR or whether they applied simple causal reasoning that when
somebody takes his or her shoes off (or wipes off the shoes), ﬂoors stay clean. What Drayton and col-
leagues’ (2011) results may show is that children who have a higher working memory capacity are the
ones who can think of more possibilities, which increases the likelihood of success at least on the ante-
cedent tasks.
Barrouillet and Lecas (1999) similarly found that children’s ability to produce more mental models
is connected with higher working memory capacity. Participants (8–14 years of age) were told that a
child is unsure about how he should get dressed. His mother says, ‘‘If you put on a white shirt, then
you must put on green trousers.’’ It was the participants’ task to ﬁnd all of the ways the child can
get dressed while obeying his mother’s rule. Children who produced more cases that were logically
consistent with the conditional statement had higher scores on a working memory task (counting
span). It was concluded that a higher working memory span enables children to produce a larger num-
ber of models underlying a conditional statement.
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sible worlds) one can keep in mind. In both of our tasks, the undiscriminating and discriminating ones,
children need to bear in mind two world models: one that represents the real world and another one
that represents the counterfactual world. Because the number of worlds is the same for both condi-
tions, this should not account for the differences that we found. However, in the discriminating task,
there are extra pieces of information that need to be taken into account (e.g., that the girl is not tall
enough in Study 1, that Max walked over the clean ﬂoor with his dirty shoes in Study 2). This might
place more demands on working memory than is the case in the undiscriminating condition. Memory
limitation could explain why children do not keep the fact that the candy was on the top shelf (in
Example 1) or on the bottom shelf (in Example 2) in mind when thinking about the counterfactual
problem. This would force them to make liberal assumptions from where the protagonist would be
fetching the candy (probably the one that comes to their mind ﬁrst). Although the most obvious ﬁrst
association would still lead to the same and correct answer in Example 2, it would mislead children
who assume that the candy is where the girl can reach it (on the bottom shelf) in Example 1.
The current results do not allow us to eliminate this possibility. German and Nichols (2003), how-
ever, presented some evidence that this explanation might be true only for 3-year-olds but not for 4-
year-olds (and, therefore, older children). They presented children with a chain of events. For example,
Mrs. Rosy has planted a new ﬂower and calls her husband to come and look. When Mr. Rosy leaves the
house, the dog escapes. The dog runs around the garden and suddenly jumps on the ﬂower, which
makes Mrs. Rosy very sad. Children were then either asked to make longer chain inferences (e.g.,
‘‘What if Mrs. Rosy hadn’t called her husband, would Mrs. Rosy be happy or sad?’’) or a short chain
inference (‘‘What if the dog hadn’t squashed the ﬂower, would Mrs. Rosy be happy or sad?’’). German
and Nichols (2003) stated, ‘‘For each event in the chain, the outcome of mutating that event results in a
proposition that differs from the sequence of events that actually happened’’ (p. 520). For the longer
inference chains, this means that there are more representations of the stored event sequence that
need to be considered. In addition, they need to be adapted (i.e., the husband who came out of the
house needs to be changed into the husband who stayed in the house and the dog who escaped needs
to be changed into the dog who did not escape). The number of representations and their adaptations
made a difference for the 3-year-olds who performed above chance on the short chain inference but
not on the longer chain inferences. The 4-year-olds, in contrast, performed above chance on all coun-
terfactual questions. We take these results as an indication that children at around 4 years of age have
enough working memory capacity to remember and make inferences from a sequence of adapted
events. Although Explanation (a) above does seem quite unlikely to explain the differences we found,
future studies should include measures for working memory to get a clearer picture of the impact of
cognitive demands.
Explanation (b) above suggests that it is not a capacity limitation that keeps children from obeying
the nearest possible world constraint. It could be argued that Beck and colleagues’ (2006) ﬁndings
show that 6-year-olds understand this constraint: They answered correctly that a mouse that came
down on the left side of a slide would be on the right side if it had gone the other way. So, children
changed everything that was causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption (i.e., that the
mouse goes the other way) while also referring to the real-world event (i.e., to make sense of the
‘‘other’’ way, one needs to know that this refers to the left side, where the mouse had actually come
down). However, we suspect that the word ‘‘other’’ prompted children to search for a reference point
in the real world, causing them to ﬁll in missing gaps with speciﬁc instances of that world. The real-
world event comes into the picture only because of interpreting the word ‘‘other’’ and not as a prin-
ciple of keeping counterfactual events as close as possible to the actual event and so understanding the
constraint. This is yet another indication that children’s executive control is good enough to allow
them to follow the nearest possible world constraint; however, they lack the understanding that they
need to do so.
Alternatively, children in our study might have undone more features of the real world in that pos-
sible world than is necessary given by the stated counterfactual. Children might simply have reasoned
that if the sister had not played her drums, also grandma would not have dropped the pot. If children
undid more facts than they were supposed to undo in Study 2, then they should have done so in Study
1 too. In Study 1, children could have reasoned that if the little girl had come instead of the tall boy, the
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ing of this kind, however, would suggest that children merely undo facts without paying attention to
the causal direction. Although it is reasonable to change an event at Time 2 (the grandma not dropping
the pot) based on a changed event at Time 1 (the girl not playing her drums), it is hard to see why one
would want to change an event at Time 1 (the candy being on the bottom shelf instead of the top shelf)
because an event has changed at Time 2 (the girl coming instead of the boy). See also Lewis (1979) for
further discussion on this argument.
How could we distinguish between children who reason on the basis of BCR and children who
change too many facts? We would need to change the content of the story such that if Susi had not
acted in a certain way there would have been Outcome 1, if Max had not acted in a certain way there
would have been Outcome 2, and if neither Susi nor Max had acted in their certain ways there would
have been Outcome 3. If children erroneously undid both Susi’s and Max’s actions when asked a coun-
terfactual question concerning Susi, they should answer with Outcome 3.2
In conclusion, our data suggest that the ability to reason counterfactually develops gradually from
6 to 12 years of age. This development is surprisingly late because at around 6 years of age most chil-
dren are already equipped with a variety of necessary abilities such as keeping two models in mind
and switching between these models. This makes it unlikely that children’s problems can be explained
solely on the basis of weak executive functioning such as working memory, inhibitory control, and/or
cognitive ﬂexibility. Future studies, however, should include executive functioning measures (espe-
cially for working memory) to be able to draw a deﬁnite conclusion. In addition, further studies are
needed to ﬁnd out whether children undo more facts than they are supposed to undo. If future results
show that children undo too many facts, then this would still show that they have an incomplete grasp
of the nearest possible world criterion. Thus, we conclude that children’s problem with counterfactual
tasks lies in their lack of understanding of the following principle: One should make only necessary
changes to the real world and leave everything else the same (nearest possible world constraint). In
particular, one should change only facts that depend logically or causally on the counterfactual
assumption. This principle is deﬁnitely understood between 6 and 12 years of age.
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